At the time of the TMI accident I was working for the state Senate Education Committee in Harrisburg. On the evening of March 28th , a group of legislators and legislative staff were at a dinner meeting with a consultant at Alfred’s Victorian Restaurant. When we arrived at the dinner, we learned that there was some sort of incident at the nuclear power plant, but the details were very vague. As we left the meeting we were told that there had been a serious accident involving the possibility of a radiation leak.
when the accident occurred the Governor had only been in office for a little over seven weeks.
The next day, I attended a press conference in the Capitol Building where Governor Thornburgh and Lt. Governor Scranton spoke about the incident. This was before the construction of the Capitol Annex so the press conference was in a small room dedicated to press conferences on the 4th floor of the Capitol Building. The room was crowded with media, some of the Governor’s staff and a number of legislative staff. It is important to remember that when the accident occurred the Governor had only been in office for a little over seven weeks. Although he gave the appearance of confidence and control, it was clear the Governor was nervous. Met Ed had not been particularly forthcoming about the nature and the extent of the accident. The Governor was asked if he would order a mandated evacuation of the Harrisburg area because of the accident. He said that he would not, but that he was encouraging people to voluntarily leave. The rumor in the room that day was part of the reason the Governor didn’t order a mandatory evacuation was that the cabinet secretary who would have managed the process had himself left the area and people were unable to contact him.
After the press conference I contacted my wife and encouraged her to evacuate. At the time she was pregnant with our second child, a law student at Dickinson School of Law and an intern in a state agency in Harrisburg. She went home gathered our son, loaded her car and drove to her parents’ home outside of Wilkes-Barre.
That day in Harrisburg was surreal.
That day in Harrisburg was surreal. I remember long lines at the local banks as people went to withdraw cash to take with them as they evacuated. I remember many people closing their bank accounts afraid of what might happen to their records and their money if a meltdown were to occur. People were setting up rendezvous points to connect with their families. Working in education policy, I was aware that local school districts were preparing for an emergency. Some were planning to evacuate students to safer locations, others were keeping students in place for their parents to come get them.
Because the initial focus was on the area within a ten mile radius of the site, many people said that they were safe if they were just outside of that radius. Others were suggesting that the safest place to be in the event of a meltdown would be under the cross over bridges along Route 83. People clearly did not know what to do.
perhaps it was a good strategy, if in fact it was a strategy
That began to change when Harold Denton from the NRC arrived. He communicated very clearly what had happened, what was likely to happen and that the federal government was taking command of the site. Just the fact that he appeared at TMI created the impression that order was being restored.
I decided that after work on Friday, I would join my wife and son at her parents’ house. I attempted to contact our local doctors to get copies of our medical records, particularly those of my pregnant wife, only to learn that our primary doctor had already evacuated the area.
Over time things began to return to normal. I returned to work early the following week. My wife came back later. However, some concerns did linger. Because my wife was pregnant, we were concerned what impact the radiation release might have. When our daughter was born in June, she was jaundiced and relatively low birth weight and size. While the radiation may not have directly caused these conditions, we weren’t sure that it didn’t have a secondary effect.
I think the one clear imperative that came out of the TMI accident was the need for better planning and stronger communication. To be fair, the Thornburgh administration was very new. Should there have been a mandatory evacuation. Perhaps. It would have required an organized and coherent strategy, which clearly was not in place. Was the voluntary evacuation effective. A lot of people left without much chaos. So perhaps it was a good strategy, if in fact it was a strategy and not simply the only available option.
A couple of lessons from the incident that I think worth noting. First was the importance of planning for unforeseen incidents. Every administration is confronted with events that are unforeseen. TMI led, I believe, to better emergency planning. The second was the need for clear and confident communication. In the early hours of the incident, communication was somewhat disjointed. It was when the NRC come onsite that communications became clear. And the third is the importance of effective government oversight. Met Ed did not provide clear information about the event, it took government intervention to clearly communicate what had happened, what was happening and what needed to be done.
Dave